How does journald know the PID of a process that produces log data?












2















When I look at journalctl, it tells me the PID and the program name(or service name?) of a log entry.



Then I wondered, logs are created by other processes, how do systemd-journald know the PID of these processes when processes may only write raw strings to the unix domain socket which systemd-journald is listenning. Also, do sytemd-journald always use the same technique to detect the PID of a piece of log data even when processes are producing log using functions like sd_journal_sendv()?



Is there any documentation I should read about this?



I read JdeBP's answer and know systemd-journald listen on an Unix Domian Socket, but even if can know the peer socket address who send the log message, how does it know the PID? What if that sending socket is opened by many non-parent-children processes?










share|improve this question

























  • See: freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/…

    – George Udosen
    Dec 29 '18 at 6:11
















2















When I look at journalctl, it tells me the PID and the program name(or service name?) of a log entry.



Then I wondered, logs are created by other processes, how do systemd-journald know the PID of these processes when processes may only write raw strings to the unix domain socket which systemd-journald is listenning. Also, do sytemd-journald always use the same technique to detect the PID of a piece of log data even when processes are producing log using functions like sd_journal_sendv()?



Is there any documentation I should read about this?



I read JdeBP's answer and know systemd-journald listen on an Unix Domian Socket, but even if can know the peer socket address who send the log message, how does it know the PID? What if that sending socket is opened by many non-parent-children processes?










share|improve this question

























  • See: freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/…

    – George Udosen
    Dec 29 '18 at 6:11














2












2








2








When I look at journalctl, it tells me the PID and the program name(or service name?) of a log entry.



Then I wondered, logs are created by other processes, how do systemd-journald know the PID of these processes when processes may only write raw strings to the unix domain socket which systemd-journald is listenning. Also, do sytemd-journald always use the same technique to detect the PID of a piece of log data even when processes are producing log using functions like sd_journal_sendv()?



Is there any documentation I should read about this?



I read JdeBP's answer and know systemd-journald listen on an Unix Domian Socket, but even if can know the peer socket address who send the log message, how does it know the PID? What if that sending socket is opened by many non-parent-children processes?










share|improve this question
















When I look at journalctl, it tells me the PID and the program name(or service name?) of a log entry.



Then I wondered, logs are created by other processes, how do systemd-journald know the PID of these processes when processes may only write raw strings to the unix domain socket which systemd-journald is listenning. Also, do sytemd-journald always use the same technique to detect the PID of a piece of log data even when processes are producing log using functions like sd_journal_sendv()?



Is there any documentation I should read about this?



I read JdeBP's answer and know systemd-journald listen on an Unix Domian Socket, but even if can know the peer socket address who send the log message, how does it know the PID? What if that sending socket is opened by many non-parent-children processes?







systemd-journald ipc






share|improve this question















share|improve this question













share|improve this question




share|improve this question








edited Dec 29 '18 at 6:25







炸鱼薯条德里克

















asked Dec 29 '18 at 5:51









炸鱼薯条德里克炸鱼薯条德里克

5811316




5811316













  • See: freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/…

    – George Udosen
    Dec 29 '18 at 6:11



















  • See: freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/…

    – George Udosen
    Dec 29 '18 at 6:11

















See: freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/…

– George Udosen
Dec 29 '18 at 6:11





See: freedesktop.org/software/systemd/man/…

– George Udosen
Dec 29 '18 at 6:11










2 Answers
2






active

oldest

votes


















3














It receives the pid via the SCM_CREDENTIALS ancillary data on the unix socket with recvmsg(), see unix(7). The credentials don't have to be sent explicitly.



Example:



$ cc -Wall scm_cred.c -o scm_cred
$ ./scm_cred
scm_cred: received from 10114: pid=10114 uid=2000 gid=2000


Processes with CAP_SYS_ADMIN data can send whatever pid they want via SCM_CREDENTIALS; in the case of systemd-journald, this means they can fake entries as if logged by another process:



# cc -Wall fake.c -o fake
# setcap CAP_SYS_ADMIN+ep fake

$ ./fake `pgrep -f /usr/sbin/sshd`

# journalctl --no-pager -n 1
...
Dec 29 11:04:57 debin sshd[419]: fake log message from 14202
# rm fake
# lsb_release -d
Description: Debian GNU/Linux 9.6 (stretch)


systemd-journald handles datagrams and credentials sent via ancillary data is in the server_process_datagram() function from journald-server.c. Both the syslog(3) standard function from libc and sd_journal_sendv() from libsystemd will send their data via a SOCK_DGRAM socket by default, and getsockopt(SO_PEERCRED) does not work on datagram (connectionless) sockets. Neither systemd-journald nor rsyslogd accept SOCK_STREAM connections on /dev/log.



scm_cred.c



#define _GNU_SOURCE     1
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/un.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <err.h>

int main(void){
int fd[2]; pid_t pid;
if(socketpair(AF_LOCAL, SOCK_DGRAM, 0, fd)) err(1, "socketpair");
if((pid = fork()) == -1) err(1, "fork");
if(pid){ /* parent */
int on = 1;
union {
struct cmsghdr h;
char data[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(struct ucred))];
} buf;
struct msghdr m = {0};
struct ucred *uc = (struct ucred*)CMSG_DATA(&buf.h);
m.msg_control = &buf;
m.msg_controllen = sizeof buf;
if(setsockopt(fd[0], SOL_SOCKET, SO_PASSCRED, &on, sizeof on))
err(1, "setsockopt");
if(recvmsg(fd[0], &m, 0) == -1) err(1, "recvmsg");
warnx("received from %d: pid=%d uid=%d gid=%d", pid,
uc->pid, uc->uid, uc->gid);
}else /* child */
write(fd[1], 0, 0);
return 0;
}


fake.c



#define _GNU_SOURCE     1
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/un.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <err.h>

int main(int ac, char **av){
union {
struct cmsghdr h;
char data[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(struct ucred))];
} cm;
int fd; char buf[256];
struct ucred *uc = (struct ucred*)CMSG_DATA(&cm.h);
struct msghdr m = {0};
struct sockaddr_un ua = {AF_UNIX, "/dev/log"};
struct iovec iov = {buf};
if((fd = socket(AF_LOCAL, SOCK_DGRAM, 0)) == -1) err(1, "socket");
if(connect(fd, (struct sockaddr*)&ua, SUN_LEN(&ua))) err(1, "connect");
m.msg_control = &cm;
m.msg_controllen = cm.h.cmsg_len = CMSG_LEN(sizeof(struct ucred));
cm.h.cmsg_level = SOL_SOCKET;
cm.h.cmsg_type = SCM_CREDENTIALS;
uc->pid = ac > 1 ? atoi(av[1]) : getpid();
uc->uid = ac > 2 ? atoi(av[2]) : geteuid();
uc->gid = ac > 3 ? atoi(av[3]) : getegid();
iov.iov_len = snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "<13>%s from %d",
ac > 4 ? av[4] : "fake log message", getpid());
if(iov.iov_len >= sizeof buf) errx(1, "message too long");
m.msg_iov = &iov;
m.msg_iovlen = 1;
if(sendmsg(fd, &m, 0) == -1) err(1, "sendmsg");
return 0;
}





share|improve this answer


























  • I see. So get the sender's info doesn't need the sender process to send it initiatively. But what if the sender process has CAP_SYS_ADMIN and sendmsg() a PID different from its own? Will systemd-journald get tricked by this behaviour?

    – 炸鱼薯条德里克
    Dec 29 '18 at 7:36













  • no, the kernel checks the credentials. that's mentioned in the unix(7) manpage under SCM_CREDENTIALS.

    – mosvy
    Dec 29 '18 at 7:38











  • Yeah, but it mentioned The sender must specify its own process ID (unless it has the capability CAP_SYS_ADMIN). That's why I mention the CAP_SYS_ADMIN, am I misunderstanding anything?

    – 炸鱼薯条德里克
    Dec 29 '18 at 7:40











  • Yes, a process with CAP_SYS_ADMIN can send a pid different from its own. (Haven't tested it, though)

    – mosvy
    Dec 29 '18 at 7:43



















0














The kernel tells it.



The EUID, EGID, and PID of the original client process that connected the AF_LOCAL stream socket at /run/systemd/journal/stdout is available from the kernel via the SO_PEERCRED socket option, which it uses. UCSPI-UNIX tools obtain this same information via the same system call.



Child service processes of course inherit their standard I/O file descriptors already opened (unless the parent service process changes this, of course), and so to systemd-journald all log output has the credentials of the original parent process.



Log output generated via the AF_LOCAL socket at /run/systemd/journal/socket that speaks the idiosyncratic systemd-journald protocol is coming over a datagram socket, rather than a stream one. This socket is flagged using the SO_PASSCRED socket option so that the kernel records the same information in each datagram sent, which is pulled out of each datagram by systemd-journald.



Further reading





  • getsockopt(). Linux Programmers' Manual. 2017-09-15.


  • socket. Linux Programmers' Manual. 2018-02-02.

  • Jonathan de Boyne Pollard (2017). local-stream-socket-accept. nosh Guide. Softwares.

  • Jonathan de Boyne Pollard (2015). "Environment variables". The gen on the UNIX Client-Server Program Interface. Frequently Given Answers.






share|improve this answer
























  • no, it doesn't get it via SO_PEERCRED, but via ancillary data with recvmsg. I've strace'd systemd-journald.

    – mosvy
    Dec 29 '18 at 8:10













  • … and you haven't read what you are commenting on, or my previous answer referred to in the question, or indeed all of what the question asks.

    – JdeBP
    Dec 29 '18 at 17:05











  • Because the rude dress-down may give the wrong impressions wrt the accuracy of this answer, I want to make it clear: this answer is wrong. I'll try to explain why. 1. Portable apps which are using syslog() do not connect to the stream socket from /run/systemd/journal/stdout; they simply send their data from an unconnected, datagram to /dev/log. Since SO_PEERCRED is getting the creds of the process that connected to a socket, and does not work with connectionless sockets, it cannot be and is not used to get the pid of the process that called syslog().

    – mosvy
    Dec 30 '18 at 8:01











  • 2. unless overrided by a privileged process, the creds that systemd gets via recvmsg as described in my answer will be those of the process that called send() by way of syslog(), not of the parent process that created the socket or called connect() on it. The second paragraph is particularly misleading, because even SO_PEERCRED on a connection-based socket will not return the creds of the process that created the socket file descriptor, but of the process that connect()ed it.

    – mosvy
    Dec 30 '18 at 8:02











  • 3. The SO_PASSCRED option should be set on the socket on which the creds are to be received, not on the socket on which they're sent, and it does not cause the kernel to stick the same info in each datagram sent in the way it's described in the 3rd paragraph.

    – mosvy
    Dec 30 '18 at 8:03











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2 Answers
2






active

oldest

votes








2 Answers
2






active

oldest

votes









active

oldest

votes






active

oldest

votes









3














It receives the pid via the SCM_CREDENTIALS ancillary data on the unix socket with recvmsg(), see unix(7). The credentials don't have to be sent explicitly.



Example:



$ cc -Wall scm_cred.c -o scm_cred
$ ./scm_cred
scm_cred: received from 10114: pid=10114 uid=2000 gid=2000


Processes with CAP_SYS_ADMIN data can send whatever pid they want via SCM_CREDENTIALS; in the case of systemd-journald, this means they can fake entries as if logged by another process:



# cc -Wall fake.c -o fake
# setcap CAP_SYS_ADMIN+ep fake

$ ./fake `pgrep -f /usr/sbin/sshd`

# journalctl --no-pager -n 1
...
Dec 29 11:04:57 debin sshd[419]: fake log message from 14202
# rm fake
# lsb_release -d
Description: Debian GNU/Linux 9.6 (stretch)


systemd-journald handles datagrams and credentials sent via ancillary data is in the server_process_datagram() function from journald-server.c. Both the syslog(3) standard function from libc and sd_journal_sendv() from libsystemd will send their data via a SOCK_DGRAM socket by default, and getsockopt(SO_PEERCRED) does not work on datagram (connectionless) sockets. Neither systemd-journald nor rsyslogd accept SOCK_STREAM connections on /dev/log.



scm_cred.c



#define _GNU_SOURCE     1
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/un.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <err.h>

int main(void){
int fd[2]; pid_t pid;
if(socketpair(AF_LOCAL, SOCK_DGRAM, 0, fd)) err(1, "socketpair");
if((pid = fork()) == -1) err(1, "fork");
if(pid){ /* parent */
int on = 1;
union {
struct cmsghdr h;
char data[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(struct ucred))];
} buf;
struct msghdr m = {0};
struct ucred *uc = (struct ucred*)CMSG_DATA(&buf.h);
m.msg_control = &buf;
m.msg_controllen = sizeof buf;
if(setsockopt(fd[0], SOL_SOCKET, SO_PASSCRED, &on, sizeof on))
err(1, "setsockopt");
if(recvmsg(fd[0], &m, 0) == -1) err(1, "recvmsg");
warnx("received from %d: pid=%d uid=%d gid=%d", pid,
uc->pid, uc->uid, uc->gid);
}else /* child */
write(fd[1], 0, 0);
return 0;
}


fake.c



#define _GNU_SOURCE     1
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/un.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <err.h>

int main(int ac, char **av){
union {
struct cmsghdr h;
char data[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(struct ucred))];
} cm;
int fd; char buf[256];
struct ucred *uc = (struct ucred*)CMSG_DATA(&cm.h);
struct msghdr m = {0};
struct sockaddr_un ua = {AF_UNIX, "/dev/log"};
struct iovec iov = {buf};
if((fd = socket(AF_LOCAL, SOCK_DGRAM, 0)) == -1) err(1, "socket");
if(connect(fd, (struct sockaddr*)&ua, SUN_LEN(&ua))) err(1, "connect");
m.msg_control = &cm;
m.msg_controllen = cm.h.cmsg_len = CMSG_LEN(sizeof(struct ucred));
cm.h.cmsg_level = SOL_SOCKET;
cm.h.cmsg_type = SCM_CREDENTIALS;
uc->pid = ac > 1 ? atoi(av[1]) : getpid();
uc->uid = ac > 2 ? atoi(av[2]) : geteuid();
uc->gid = ac > 3 ? atoi(av[3]) : getegid();
iov.iov_len = snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "<13>%s from %d",
ac > 4 ? av[4] : "fake log message", getpid());
if(iov.iov_len >= sizeof buf) errx(1, "message too long");
m.msg_iov = &iov;
m.msg_iovlen = 1;
if(sendmsg(fd, &m, 0) == -1) err(1, "sendmsg");
return 0;
}





share|improve this answer


























  • I see. So get the sender's info doesn't need the sender process to send it initiatively. But what if the sender process has CAP_SYS_ADMIN and sendmsg() a PID different from its own? Will systemd-journald get tricked by this behaviour?

    – 炸鱼薯条德里克
    Dec 29 '18 at 7:36













  • no, the kernel checks the credentials. that's mentioned in the unix(7) manpage under SCM_CREDENTIALS.

    – mosvy
    Dec 29 '18 at 7:38











  • Yeah, but it mentioned The sender must specify its own process ID (unless it has the capability CAP_SYS_ADMIN). That's why I mention the CAP_SYS_ADMIN, am I misunderstanding anything?

    – 炸鱼薯条德里克
    Dec 29 '18 at 7:40











  • Yes, a process with CAP_SYS_ADMIN can send a pid different from its own. (Haven't tested it, though)

    – mosvy
    Dec 29 '18 at 7:43
















3














It receives the pid via the SCM_CREDENTIALS ancillary data on the unix socket with recvmsg(), see unix(7). The credentials don't have to be sent explicitly.



Example:



$ cc -Wall scm_cred.c -o scm_cred
$ ./scm_cred
scm_cred: received from 10114: pid=10114 uid=2000 gid=2000


Processes with CAP_SYS_ADMIN data can send whatever pid they want via SCM_CREDENTIALS; in the case of systemd-journald, this means they can fake entries as if logged by another process:



# cc -Wall fake.c -o fake
# setcap CAP_SYS_ADMIN+ep fake

$ ./fake `pgrep -f /usr/sbin/sshd`

# journalctl --no-pager -n 1
...
Dec 29 11:04:57 debin sshd[419]: fake log message from 14202
# rm fake
# lsb_release -d
Description: Debian GNU/Linux 9.6 (stretch)


systemd-journald handles datagrams and credentials sent via ancillary data is in the server_process_datagram() function from journald-server.c. Both the syslog(3) standard function from libc and sd_journal_sendv() from libsystemd will send their data via a SOCK_DGRAM socket by default, and getsockopt(SO_PEERCRED) does not work on datagram (connectionless) sockets. Neither systemd-journald nor rsyslogd accept SOCK_STREAM connections on /dev/log.



scm_cred.c



#define _GNU_SOURCE     1
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/un.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <err.h>

int main(void){
int fd[2]; pid_t pid;
if(socketpair(AF_LOCAL, SOCK_DGRAM, 0, fd)) err(1, "socketpair");
if((pid = fork()) == -1) err(1, "fork");
if(pid){ /* parent */
int on = 1;
union {
struct cmsghdr h;
char data[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(struct ucred))];
} buf;
struct msghdr m = {0};
struct ucred *uc = (struct ucred*)CMSG_DATA(&buf.h);
m.msg_control = &buf;
m.msg_controllen = sizeof buf;
if(setsockopt(fd[0], SOL_SOCKET, SO_PASSCRED, &on, sizeof on))
err(1, "setsockopt");
if(recvmsg(fd[0], &m, 0) == -1) err(1, "recvmsg");
warnx("received from %d: pid=%d uid=%d gid=%d", pid,
uc->pid, uc->uid, uc->gid);
}else /* child */
write(fd[1], 0, 0);
return 0;
}


fake.c



#define _GNU_SOURCE     1
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/un.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <err.h>

int main(int ac, char **av){
union {
struct cmsghdr h;
char data[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(struct ucred))];
} cm;
int fd; char buf[256];
struct ucred *uc = (struct ucred*)CMSG_DATA(&cm.h);
struct msghdr m = {0};
struct sockaddr_un ua = {AF_UNIX, "/dev/log"};
struct iovec iov = {buf};
if((fd = socket(AF_LOCAL, SOCK_DGRAM, 0)) == -1) err(1, "socket");
if(connect(fd, (struct sockaddr*)&ua, SUN_LEN(&ua))) err(1, "connect");
m.msg_control = &cm;
m.msg_controllen = cm.h.cmsg_len = CMSG_LEN(sizeof(struct ucred));
cm.h.cmsg_level = SOL_SOCKET;
cm.h.cmsg_type = SCM_CREDENTIALS;
uc->pid = ac > 1 ? atoi(av[1]) : getpid();
uc->uid = ac > 2 ? atoi(av[2]) : geteuid();
uc->gid = ac > 3 ? atoi(av[3]) : getegid();
iov.iov_len = snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "<13>%s from %d",
ac > 4 ? av[4] : "fake log message", getpid());
if(iov.iov_len >= sizeof buf) errx(1, "message too long");
m.msg_iov = &iov;
m.msg_iovlen = 1;
if(sendmsg(fd, &m, 0) == -1) err(1, "sendmsg");
return 0;
}





share|improve this answer


























  • I see. So get the sender's info doesn't need the sender process to send it initiatively. But what if the sender process has CAP_SYS_ADMIN and sendmsg() a PID different from its own? Will systemd-journald get tricked by this behaviour?

    – 炸鱼薯条德里克
    Dec 29 '18 at 7:36













  • no, the kernel checks the credentials. that's mentioned in the unix(7) manpage under SCM_CREDENTIALS.

    – mosvy
    Dec 29 '18 at 7:38











  • Yeah, but it mentioned The sender must specify its own process ID (unless it has the capability CAP_SYS_ADMIN). That's why I mention the CAP_SYS_ADMIN, am I misunderstanding anything?

    – 炸鱼薯条德里克
    Dec 29 '18 at 7:40











  • Yes, a process with CAP_SYS_ADMIN can send a pid different from its own. (Haven't tested it, though)

    – mosvy
    Dec 29 '18 at 7:43














3












3








3







It receives the pid via the SCM_CREDENTIALS ancillary data on the unix socket with recvmsg(), see unix(7). The credentials don't have to be sent explicitly.



Example:



$ cc -Wall scm_cred.c -o scm_cred
$ ./scm_cred
scm_cred: received from 10114: pid=10114 uid=2000 gid=2000


Processes with CAP_SYS_ADMIN data can send whatever pid they want via SCM_CREDENTIALS; in the case of systemd-journald, this means they can fake entries as if logged by another process:



# cc -Wall fake.c -o fake
# setcap CAP_SYS_ADMIN+ep fake

$ ./fake `pgrep -f /usr/sbin/sshd`

# journalctl --no-pager -n 1
...
Dec 29 11:04:57 debin sshd[419]: fake log message from 14202
# rm fake
# lsb_release -d
Description: Debian GNU/Linux 9.6 (stretch)


systemd-journald handles datagrams and credentials sent via ancillary data is in the server_process_datagram() function from journald-server.c. Both the syslog(3) standard function from libc and sd_journal_sendv() from libsystemd will send their data via a SOCK_DGRAM socket by default, and getsockopt(SO_PEERCRED) does not work on datagram (connectionless) sockets. Neither systemd-journald nor rsyslogd accept SOCK_STREAM connections on /dev/log.



scm_cred.c



#define _GNU_SOURCE     1
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/un.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <err.h>

int main(void){
int fd[2]; pid_t pid;
if(socketpair(AF_LOCAL, SOCK_DGRAM, 0, fd)) err(1, "socketpair");
if((pid = fork()) == -1) err(1, "fork");
if(pid){ /* parent */
int on = 1;
union {
struct cmsghdr h;
char data[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(struct ucred))];
} buf;
struct msghdr m = {0};
struct ucred *uc = (struct ucred*)CMSG_DATA(&buf.h);
m.msg_control = &buf;
m.msg_controllen = sizeof buf;
if(setsockopt(fd[0], SOL_SOCKET, SO_PASSCRED, &on, sizeof on))
err(1, "setsockopt");
if(recvmsg(fd[0], &m, 0) == -1) err(1, "recvmsg");
warnx("received from %d: pid=%d uid=%d gid=%d", pid,
uc->pid, uc->uid, uc->gid);
}else /* child */
write(fd[1], 0, 0);
return 0;
}


fake.c



#define _GNU_SOURCE     1
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/un.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <err.h>

int main(int ac, char **av){
union {
struct cmsghdr h;
char data[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(struct ucred))];
} cm;
int fd; char buf[256];
struct ucred *uc = (struct ucred*)CMSG_DATA(&cm.h);
struct msghdr m = {0};
struct sockaddr_un ua = {AF_UNIX, "/dev/log"};
struct iovec iov = {buf};
if((fd = socket(AF_LOCAL, SOCK_DGRAM, 0)) == -1) err(1, "socket");
if(connect(fd, (struct sockaddr*)&ua, SUN_LEN(&ua))) err(1, "connect");
m.msg_control = &cm;
m.msg_controllen = cm.h.cmsg_len = CMSG_LEN(sizeof(struct ucred));
cm.h.cmsg_level = SOL_SOCKET;
cm.h.cmsg_type = SCM_CREDENTIALS;
uc->pid = ac > 1 ? atoi(av[1]) : getpid();
uc->uid = ac > 2 ? atoi(av[2]) : geteuid();
uc->gid = ac > 3 ? atoi(av[3]) : getegid();
iov.iov_len = snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "<13>%s from %d",
ac > 4 ? av[4] : "fake log message", getpid());
if(iov.iov_len >= sizeof buf) errx(1, "message too long");
m.msg_iov = &iov;
m.msg_iovlen = 1;
if(sendmsg(fd, &m, 0) == -1) err(1, "sendmsg");
return 0;
}





share|improve this answer















It receives the pid via the SCM_CREDENTIALS ancillary data on the unix socket with recvmsg(), see unix(7). The credentials don't have to be sent explicitly.



Example:



$ cc -Wall scm_cred.c -o scm_cred
$ ./scm_cred
scm_cred: received from 10114: pid=10114 uid=2000 gid=2000


Processes with CAP_SYS_ADMIN data can send whatever pid they want via SCM_CREDENTIALS; in the case of systemd-journald, this means they can fake entries as if logged by another process:



# cc -Wall fake.c -o fake
# setcap CAP_SYS_ADMIN+ep fake

$ ./fake `pgrep -f /usr/sbin/sshd`

# journalctl --no-pager -n 1
...
Dec 29 11:04:57 debin sshd[419]: fake log message from 14202
# rm fake
# lsb_release -d
Description: Debian GNU/Linux 9.6 (stretch)


systemd-journald handles datagrams and credentials sent via ancillary data is in the server_process_datagram() function from journald-server.c. Both the syslog(3) standard function from libc and sd_journal_sendv() from libsystemd will send their data via a SOCK_DGRAM socket by default, and getsockopt(SO_PEERCRED) does not work on datagram (connectionless) sockets. Neither systemd-journald nor rsyslogd accept SOCK_STREAM connections on /dev/log.



scm_cred.c



#define _GNU_SOURCE     1
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/un.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <err.h>

int main(void){
int fd[2]; pid_t pid;
if(socketpair(AF_LOCAL, SOCK_DGRAM, 0, fd)) err(1, "socketpair");
if((pid = fork()) == -1) err(1, "fork");
if(pid){ /* parent */
int on = 1;
union {
struct cmsghdr h;
char data[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(struct ucred))];
} buf;
struct msghdr m = {0};
struct ucred *uc = (struct ucred*)CMSG_DATA(&buf.h);
m.msg_control = &buf;
m.msg_controllen = sizeof buf;
if(setsockopt(fd[0], SOL_SOCKET, SO_PASSCRED, &on, sizeof on))
err(1, "setsockopt");
if(recvmsg(fd[0], &m, 0) == -1) err(1, "recvmsg");
warnx("received from %d: pid=%d uid=%d gid=%d", pid,
uc->pid, uc->uid, uc->gid);
}else /* child */
write(fd[1], 0, 0);
return 0;
}


fake.c



#define _GNU_SOURCE     1
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/un.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <err.h>

int main(int ac, char **av){
union {
struct cmsghdr h;
char data[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(struct ucred))];
} cm;
int fd; char buf[256];
struct ucred *uc = (struct ucred*)CMSG_DATA(&cm.h);
struct msghdr m = {0};
struct sockaddr_un ua = {AF_UNIX, "/dev/log"};
struct iovec iov = {buf};
if((fd = socket(AF_LOCAL, SOCK_DGRAM, 0)) == -1) err(1, "socket");
if(connect(fd, (struct sockaddr*)&ua, SUN_LEN(&ua))) err(1, "connect");
m.msg_control = &cm;
m.msg_controllen = cm.h.cmsg_len = CMSG_LEN(sizeof(struct ucred));
cm.h.cmsg_level = SOL_SOCKET;
cm.h.cmsg_type = SCM_CREDENTIALS;
uc->pid = ac > 1 ? atoi(av[1]) : getpid();
uc->uid = ac > 2 ? atoi(av[2]) : geteuid();
uc->gid = ac > 3 ? atoi(av[3]) : getegid();
iov.iov_len = snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "<13>%s from %d",
ac > 4 ? av[4] : "fake log message", getpid());
if(iov.iov_len >= sizeof buf) errx(1, "message too long");
m.msg_iov = &iov;
m.msg_iovlen = 1;
if(sendmsg(fd, &m, 0) == -1) err(1, "sendmsg");
return 0;
}






share|improve this answer














share|improve this answer



share|improve this answer








edited Dec 29 '18 at 18:24

























answered Dec 29 '18 at 7:04









mosvymosvy

8,3521732




8,3521732













  • I see. So get the sender's info doesn't need the sender process to send it initiatively. But what if the sender process has CAP_SYS_ADMIN and sendmsg() a PID different from its own? Will systemd-journald get tricked by this behaviour?

    – 炸鱼薯条德里克
    Dec 29 '18 at 7:36













  • no, the kernel checks the credentials. that's mentioned in the unix(7) manpage under SCM_CREDENTIALS.

    – mosvy
    Dec 29 '18 at 7:38











  • Yeah, but it mentioned The sender must specify its own process ID (unless it has the capability CAP_SYS_ADMIN). That's why I mention the CAP_SYS_ADMIN, am I misunderstanding anything?

    – 炸鱼薯条德里克
    Dec 29 '18 at 7:40











  • Yes, a process with CAP_SYS_ADMIN can send a pid different from its own. (Haven't tested it, though)

    – mosvy
    Dec 29 '18 at 7:43



















  • I see. So get the sender's info doesn't need the sender process to send it initiatively. But what if the sender process has CAP_SYS_ADMIN and sendmsg() a PID different from its own? Will systemd-journald get tricked by this behaviour?

    – 炸鱼薯条德里克
    Dec 29 '18 at 7:36













  • no, the kernel checks the credentials. that's mentioned in the unix(7) manpage under SCM_CREDENTIALS.

    – mosvy
    Dec 29 '18 at 7:38











  • Yeah, but it mentioned The sender must specify its own process ID (unless it has the capability CAP_SYS_ADMIN). That's why I mention the CAP_SYS_ADMIN, am I misunderstanding anything?

    – 炸鱼薯条德里克
    Dec 29 '18 at 7:40











  • Yes, a process with CAP_SYS_ADMIN can send a pid different from its own. (Haven't tested it, though)

    – mosvy
    Dec 29 '18 at 7:43

















I see. So get the sender's info doesn't need the sender process to send it initiatively. But what if the sender process has CAP_SYS_ADMIN and sendmsg() a PID different from its own? Will systemd-journald get tricked by this behaviour?

– 炸鱼薯条德里克
Dec 29 '18 at 7:36







I see. So get the sender's info doesn't need the sender process to send it initiatively. But what if the sender process has CAP_SYS_ADMIN and sendmsg() a PID different from its own? Will systemd-journald get tricked by this behaviour?

– 炸鱼薯条德里克
Dec 29 '18 at 7:36















no, the kernel checks the credentials. that's mentioned in the unix(7) manpage under SCM_CREDENTIALS.

– mosvy
Dec 29 '18 at 7:38





no, the kernel checks the credentials. that's mentioned in the unix(7) manpage under SCM_CREDENTIALS.

– mosvy
Dec 29 '18 at 7:38













Yeah, but it mentioned The sender must specify its own process ID (unless it has the capability CAP_SYS_ADMIN). That's why I mention the CAP_SYS_ADMIN, am I misunderstanding anything?

– 炸鱼薯条德里克
Dec 29 '18 at 7:40





Yeah, but it mentioned The sender must specify its own process ID (unless it has the capability CAP_SYS_ADMIN). That's why I mention the CAP_SYS_ADMIN, am I misunderstanding anything?

– 炸鱼薯条德里克
Dec 29 '18 at 7:40













Yes, a process with CAP_SYS_ADMIN can send a pid different from its own. (Haven't tested it, though)

– mosvy
Dec 29 '18 at 7:43





Yes, a process with CAP_SYS_ADMIN can send a pid different from its own. (Haven't tested it, though)

– mosvy
Dec 29 '18 at 7:43













0














The kernel tells it.



The EUID, EGID, and PID of the original client process that connected the AF_LOCAL stream socket at /run/systemd/journal/stdout is available from the kernel via the SO_PEERCRED socket option, which it uses. UCSPI-UNIX tools obtain this same information via the same system call.



Child service processes of course inherit their standard I/O file descriptors already opened (unless the parent service process changes this, of course), and so to systemd-journald all log output has the credentials of the original parent process.



Log output generated via the AF_LOCAL socket at /run/systemd/journal/socket that speaks the idiosyncratic systemd-journald protocol is coming over a datagram socket, rather than a stream one. This socket is flagged using the SO_PASSCRED socket option so that the kernel records the same information in each datagram sent, which is pulled out of each datagram by systemd-journald.



Further reading





  • getsockopt(). Linux Programmers' Manual. 2017-09-15.


  • socket. Linux Programmers' Manual. 2018-02-02.

  • Jonathan de Boyne Pollard (2017). local-stream-socket-accept. nosh Guide. Softwares.

  • Jonathan de Boyne Pollard (2015). "Environment variables". The gen on the UNIX Client-Server Program Interface. Frequently Given Answers.






share|improve this answer
























  • no, it doesn't get it via SO_PEERCRED, but via ancillary data with recvmsg. I've strace'd systemd-journald.

    – mosvy
    Dec 29 '18 at 8:10













  • … and you haven't read what you are commenting on, or my previous answer referred to in the question, or indeed all of what the question asks.

    – JdeBP
    Dec 29 '18 at 17:05











  • Because the rude dress-down may give the wrong impressions wrt the accuracy of this answer, I want to make it clear: this answer is wrong. I'll try to explain why. 1. Portable apps which are using syslog() do not connect to the stream socket from /run/systemd/journal/stdout; they simply send their data from an unconnected, datagram to /dev/log. Since SO_PEERCRED is getting the creds of the process that connected to a socket, and does not work with connectionless sockets, it cannot be and is not used to get the pid of the process that called syslog().

    – mosvy
    Dec 30 '18 at 8:01











  • 2. unless overrided by a privileged process, the creds that systemd gets via recvmsg as described in my answer will be those of the process that called send() by way of syslog(), not of the parent process that created the socket or called connect() on it. The second paragraph is particularly misleading, because even SO_PEERCRED on a connection-based socket will not return the creds of the process that created the socket file descriptor, but of the process that connect()ed it.

    – mosvy
    Dec 30 '18 at 8:02











  • 3. The SO_PASSCRED option should be set on the socket on which the creds are to be received, not on the socket on which they're sent, and it does not cause the kernel to stick the same info in each datagram sent in the way it's described in the 3rd paragraph.

    – mosvy
    Dec 30 '18 at 8:03
















0














The kernel tells it.



The EUID, EGID, and PID of the original client process that connected the AF_LOCAL stream socket at /run/systemd/journal/stdout is available from the kernel via the SO_PEERCRED socket option, which it uses. UCSPI-UNIX tools obtain this same information via the same system call.



Child service processes of course inherit their standard I/O file descriptors already opened (unless the parent service process changes this, of course), and so to systemd-journald all log output has the credentials of the original parent process.



Log output generated via the AF_LOCAL socket at /run/systemd/journal/socket that speaks the idiosyncratic systemd-journald protocol is coming over a datagram socket, rather than a stream one. This socket is flagged using the SO_PASSCRED socket option so that the kernel records the same information in each datagram sent, which is pulled out of each datagram by systemd-journald.



Further reading





  • getsockopt(). Linux Programmers' Manual. 2017-09-15.


  • socket. Linux Programmers' Manual. 2018-02-02.

  • Jonathan de Boyne Pollard (2017). local-stream-socket-accept. nosh Guide. Softwares.

  • Jonathan de Boyne Pollard (2015). "Environment variables". The gen on the UNIX Client-Server Program Interface. Frequently Given Answers.






share|improve this answer
























  • no, it doesn't get it via SO_PEERCRED, but via ancillary data with recvmsg. I've strace'd systemd-journald.

    – mosvy
    Dec 29 '18 at 8:10













  • … and you haven't read what you are commenting on, or my previous answer referred to in the question, or indeed all of what the question asks.

    – JdeBP
    Dec 29 '18 at 17:05











  • Because the rude dress-down may give the wrong impressions wrt the accuracy of this answer, I want to make it clear: this answer is wrong. I'll try to explain why. 1. Portable apps which are using syslog() do not connect to the stream socket from /run/systemd/journal/stdout; they simply send their data from an unconnected, datagram to /dev/log. Since SO_PEERCRED is getting the creds of the process that connected to a socket, and does not work with connectionless sockets, it cannot be and is not used to get the pid of the process that called syslog().

    – mosvy
    Dec 30 '18 at 8:01











  • 2. unless overrided by a privileged process, the creds that systemd gets via recvmsg as described in my answer will be those of the process that called send() by way of syslog(), not of the parent process that created the socket or called connect() on it. The second paragraph is particularly misleading, because even SO_PEERCRED on a connection-based socket will not return the creds of the process that created the socket file descriptor, but of the process that connect()ed it.

    – mosvy
    Dec 30 '18 at 8:02











  • 3. The SO_PASSCRED option should be set on the socket on which the creds are to be received, not on the socket on which they're sent, and it does not cause the kernel to stick the same info in each datagram sent in the way it's described in the 3rd paragraph.

    – mosvy
    Dec 30 '18 at 8:03














0












0








0







The kernel tells it.



The EUID, EGID, and PID of the original client process that connected the AF_LOCAL stream socket at /run/systemd/journal/stdout is available from the kernel via the SO_PEERCRED socket option, which it uses. UCSPI-UNIX tools obtain this same information via the same system call.



Child service processes of course inherit their standard I/O file descriptors already opened (unless the parent service process changes this, of course), and so to systemd-journald all log output has the credentials of the original parent process.



Log output generated via the AF_LOCAL socket at /run/systemd/journal/socket that speaks the idiosyncratic systemd-journald protocol is coming over a datagram socket, rather than a stream one. This socket is flagged using the SO_PASSCRED socket option so that the kernel records the same information in each datagram sent, which is pulled out of each datagram by systemd-journald.



Further reading





  • getsockopt(). Linux Programmers' Manual. 2017-09-15.


  • socket. Linux Programmers' Manual. 2018-02-02.

  • Jonathan de Boyne Pollard (2017). local-stream-socket-accept. nosh Guide. Softwares.

  • Jonathan de Boyne Pollard (2015). "Environment variables". The gen on the UNIX Client-Server Program Interface. Frequently Given Answers.






share|improve this answer













The kernel tells it.



The EUID, EGID, and PID of the original client process that connected the AF_LOCAL stream socket at /run/systemd/journal/stdout is available from the kernel via the SO_PEERCRED socket option, which it uses. UCSPI-UNIX tools obtain this same information via the same system call.



Child service processes of course inherit their standard I/O file descriptors already opened (unless the parent service process changes this, of course), and so to systemd-journald all log output has the credentials of the original parent process.



Log output generated via the AF_LOCAL socket at /run/systemd/journal/socket that speaks the idiosyncratic systemd-journald protocol is coming over a datagram socket, rather than a stream one. This socket is flagged using the SO_PASSCRED socket option so that the kernel records the same information in each datagram sent, which is pulled out of each datagram by systemd-journald.



Further reading





  • getsockopt(). Linux Programmers' Manual. 2017-09-15.


  • socket. Linux Programmers' Manual. 2018-02-02.

  • Jonathan de Boyne Pollard (2017). local-stream-socket-accept. nosh Guide. Softwares.

  • Jonathan de Boyne Pollard (2015). "Environment variables". The gen on the UNIX Client-Server Program Interface. Frequently Given Answers.







share|improve this answer












share|improve this answer



share|improve this answer










answered Dec 29 '18 at 7:56









JdeBPJdeBP

37.2k477178




37.2k477178













  • no, it doesn't get it via SO_PEERCRED, but via ancillary data with recvmsg. I've strace'd systemd-journald.

    – mosvy
    Dec 29 '18 at 8:10













  • … and you haven't read what you are commenting on, or my previous answer referred to in the question, or indeed all of what the question asks.

    – JdeBP
    Dec 29 '18 at 17:05











  • Because the rude dress-down may give the wrong impressions wrt the accuracy of this answer, I want to make it clear: this answer is wrong. I'll try to explain why. 1. Portable apps which are using syslog() do not connect to the stream socket from /run/systemd/journal/stdout; they simply send their data from an unconnected, datagram to /dev/log. Since SO_PEERCRED is getting the creds of the process that connected to a socket, and does not work with connectionless sockets, it cannot be and is not used to get the pid of the process that called syslog().

    – mosvy
    Dec 30 '18 at 8:01











  • 2. unless overrided by a privileged process, the creds that systemd gets via recvmsg as described in my answer will be those of the process that called send() by way of syslog(), not of the parent process that created the socket or called connect() on it. The second paragraph is particularly misleading, because even SO_PEERCRED on a connection-based socket will not return the creds of the process that created the socket file descriptor, but of the process that connect()ed it.

    – mosvy
    Dec 30 '18 at 8:02











  • 3. The SO_PASSCRED option should be set on the socket on which the creds are to be received, not on the socket on which they're sent, and it does not cause the kernel to stick the same info in each datagram sent in the way it's described in the 3rd paragraph.

    – mosvy
    Dec 30 '18 at 8:03



















  • no, it doesn't get it via SO_PEERCRED, but via ancillary data with recvmsg. I've strace'd systemd-journald.

    – mosvy
    Dec 29 '18 at 8:10













  • … and you haven't read what you are commenting on, or my previous answer referred to in the question, or indeed all of what the question asks.

    – JdeBP
    Dec 29 '18 at 17:05











  • Because the rude dress-down may give the wrong impressions wrt the accuracy of this answer, I want to make it clear: this answer is wrong. I'll try to explain why. 1. Portable apps which are using syslog() do not connect to the stream socket from /run/systemd/journal/stdout; they simply send their data from an unconnected, datagram to /dev/log. Since SO_PEERCRED is getting the creds of the process that connected to a socket, and does not work with connectionless sockets, it cannot be and is not used to get the pid of the process that called syslog().

    – mosvy
    Dec 30 '18 at 8:01











  • 2. unless overrided by a privileged process, the creds that systemd gets via recvmsg as described in my answer will be those of the process that called send() by way of syslog(), not of the parent process that created the socket or called connect() on it. The second paragraph is particularly misleading, because even SO_PEERCRED on a connection-based socket will not return the creds of the process that created the socket file descriptor, but of the process that connect()ed it.

    – mosvy
    Dec 30 '18 at 8:02











  • 3. The SO_PASSCRED option should be set on the socket on which the creds are to be received, not on the socket on which they're sent, and it does not cause the kernel to stick the same info in each datagram sent in the way it's described in the 3rd paragraph.

    – mosvy
    Dec 30 '18 at 8:03

















no, it doesn't get it via SO_PEERCRED, but via ancillary data with recvmsg. I've strace'd systemd-journald.

– mosvy
Dec 29 '18 at 8:10







no, it doesn't get it via SO_PEERCRED, but via ancillary data with recvmsg. I've strace'd systemd-journald.

– mosvy
Dec 29 '18 at 8:10















… and you haven't read what you are commenting on, or my previous answer referred to in the question, or indeed all of what the question asks.

– JdeBP
Dec 29 '18 at 17:05





… and you haven't read what you are commenting on, or my previous answer referred to in the question, or indeed all of what the question asks.

– JdeBP
Dec 29 '18 at 17:05













Because the rude dress-down may give the wrong impressions wrt the accuracy of this answer, I want to make it clear: this answer is wrong. I'll try to explain why. 1. Portable apps which are using syslog() do not connect to the stream socket from /run/systemd/journal/stdout; they simply send their data from an unconnected, datagram to /dev/log. Since SO_PEERCRED is getting the creds of the process that connected to a socket, and does not work with connectionless sockets, it cannot be and is not used to get the pid of the process that called syslog().

– mosvy
Dec 30 '18 at 8:01





Because the rude dress-down may give the wrong impressions wrt the accuracy of this answer, I want to make it clear: this answer is wrong. I'll try to explain why. 1. Portable apps which are using syslog() do not connect to the stream socket from /run/systemd/journal/stdout; they simply send their data from an unconnected, datagram to /dev/log. Since SO_PEERCRED is getting the creds of the process that connected to a socket, and does not work with connectionless sockets, it cannot be and is not used to get the pid of the process that called syslog().

– mosvy
Dec 30 '18 at 8:01













2. unless overrided by a privileged process, the creds that systemd gets via recvmsg as described in my answer will be those of the process that called send() by way of syslog(), not of the parent process that created the socket or called connect() on it. The second paragraph is particularly misleading, because even SO_PEERCRED on a connection-based socket will not return the creds of the process that created the socket file descriptor, but of the process that connect()ed it.

– mosvy
Dec 30 '18 at 8:02





2. unless overrided by a privileged process, the creds that systemd gets via recvmsg as described in my answer will be those of the process that called send() by way of syslog(), not of the parent process that created the socket or called connect() on it. The second paragraph is particularly misleading, because even SO_PEERCRED on a connection-based socket will not return the creds of the process that created the socket file descriptor, but of the process that connect()ed it.

– mosvy
Dec 30 '18 at 8:02













3. The SO_PASSCRED option should be set on the socket on which the creds are to be received, not on the socket on which they're sent, and it does not cause the kernel to stick the same info in each datagram sent in the way it's described in the 3rd paragraph.

– mosvy
Dec 30 '18 at 8:03





3. The SO_PASSCRED option should be set on the socket on which the creds are to be received, not on the socket on which they're sent, and it does not cause the kernel to stick the same info in each datagram sent in the way it's described in the 3rd paragraph.

– mosvy
Dec 30 '18 at 8:03


















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